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1 Introduction
Mozambique is not only one of the world’s
poorest countries, but also has a level of
vulnerability to drought, flood, sea level rise and
increased frequency and severity of tropical
cyclones that makes it ‘one of the most exposed
countries in the world to the cumulative effects
of disaster risks and climate change’
(Environment Working Group 2009: 1).
Mozambique has been included in the Pilot
Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), a
flagship component of the Climate Investment
Funds managed by the World Bank, whose
declared aim is to help poor countries to make
the strategic investments needed to deal with
the challenge of climate change (see Seballos
and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin). PPCR initiatives
are designed to operate in two phases, with
Phase 1 consisting of a 3–18-month period of
preparatory work culminating in the preparation
of a Strategic Program for Climate Resilience,
and Phase 2 consisting of a period of up to five
years in which this plan will be implemented
through a mix of grant- and loan-funded
investments (CIF 2009a). This article examines
the process of prioritising investments under
Phase 1 of the PPCR in Mozambique, which
began in mid-2010. It asks to what extent this
process has demonstrated the ‘country
ownership’ and ‘broad participation’ that PPCR
claims to promote, in the light of the tensions
that exist between different actors’ technical,
institutional and political priorities.
The tensions between the different actor’s
priorities operate both within and between the
global, national, subnational and local levels.
Global–national tensions are shaped by the
‘contested sovereignty’ that is inseparable from
Mozambique’s status as a heavily-aided country
(de Renzio and Hanlon 2007). Although it has long
been seen as a ‘donor darling’, relations have
recently deteriorated between the Mozambique
Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique, Frelimo) government and the
international donors whose aid accounts for more
than half of the national budget. A key point of
tension has been the treatment of the opposition
party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique
(Movimento Democrático de Moçambique,
MDM), during and after the 2009 national
elections. The leader of the MDM, Daviz Simango,
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is the mayor of Mozambique’s second largest city,
Beira, which is home to a vibrant culture of
political contestation that sets it apart from the
rest of the country, and was a focal point of
Mozambique’s long and bitter civil war of 1977–92.
With over half a million inhabitants living just a
few feet above the level of the Indian Ocean,
protected only by decaying sea defences, eroding
dunes and a rapidly disappearing belt of
mangroves, Beira is also one of the places in
Mozambique that is most critically threatened by
sea level rise and the increasing frequency and
intensity of cyclones (INGC 2009). This should
make it a natural candidate for inclusion in
Mozambique’s PPCR. However, the decision to
allocate several million dollars’ worth of
international climate change finance to a city
controlled by one of the most important
opposition leaders was never going to be an easy
one for the ruling Frelimo party, accustomed to
exercising unquestioned control over the levers
of political and economic power in Mozambique.
In this article, we analyse the political economy
factors shaping the decision on whether or not to
include Beira in Mozambique’s PPCR, in the
context of an examination of the claims that the
PPCR process ‘promotes a participatory approach
for development of a broad-based strategy to
achieving climate resilience at the national level
in the medium and long-term’ (CIF 2010: 1). The
official Climate Investment Funds guidance
stresses the importance of government leadership
of design missions ‘in order to ensure a country-
driven process, including broad participation that
promotes country ownership of the PPCR
programme and its implementation as well as
partnerships among the government, national
stakeholders, and development partners’ (CIF
2009b: 4). However, there are obvious tensions
between the spirit of a ‘country-driven process’
and the fact that the PPCR gives a key role to the
multilateral development banks (MDBs) in
managing the programme, a well as privileging
their existing projects as targets for additional
funding. There are also tensions between the
spirit of ‘broad participation’ and the overriding
goal of rapid disbursement of PPCR funds (see
Seballos and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin).
In the specific context of Mozambique, we
examine the role of institutional interests and
party-political tensions in shaping the supposedly
technical process of decision-making on where
PPCR resources should be invested. In the light
of this examination, we interrogate the extent to
which ‘country ownership’ risks being conflated
with ‘government control’, and ask whether the
alternative of allowing the MDBs rather than the
government to drive the process risks delivering
even less transparency and legitimacy for PPCR
investment decisions. In examining the latter
aspect, we explore the experience of
Mozambican civil society in engaging with
PPCR, and ask whether the government and
MDBs have adhered to the exhortation in the
Climate Investment Funds guidance that they
must ‘conduct regular consultations with
relevant stakeholders, identified in a stakeholder
analysis, throughout the PPCR process to ensure
broad ownership’ (CIF 2009a: 7). We conclude by
reflecting on the lessons that analysis of the
political economy of PPCR in Mozambique can
provide for debates on ‘ownership’ and
‘participation’ in emerging climate finance
programmes.
2 Political and policy context for PPCR in
Mozambique
For more than three decades, Mozambique has
been ruled by one party: Frelimo. With power
forged in the experience of the ten-year liberation
struggle, sustainable external support and a
principle of not sharing power (Machili 1995: 389),
Frelimo has maintained a politically stable
government. The party has won every national
poll held since the start of multi-party elections in
1994. Mozambique is undergoing ‘decentralisation
and de-concentration’ processes, with responsibilities
increasingly delegated to both municipal authorities
and districts, though only the former have elected
local governments. Although opposition parties
made some gains in the first rounds of the
municipal elections (held in 1998 and 2003), in
the November 2008 municipal elections, Frelimo
won in 42 out of 43 municipalities. The only
exception was Beira, where Mayor Simango ran
as an independent candidate, defeating both
Frelimo and the major opposition party, Renamo
(of which he had previously been a member).
Observers note that the Mayor of Beira represents
a unique political phenomenon in Mozambique,
as his victory in 2008 represented the first time in
the last three decades that a candidate who did
not come from a military background had
defeated the two most well-established political
parties, Frelimo and Renamo.
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The policy environment for PPCR in Mozambique
is favourable, as evidenced by a range of
legislation and the country’s positive response to
the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) process (DFID
2009). Government policies, strategies and other
official documents such as laws and funding
agreements suggest that there is growing
awareness of climate change issues, and some
effort to mainstream them not only into the core
national development policies but also into local
government programmes. Climate change is
referred to in core policy documents, including
both the current Five Year Government Plan
(Plano Quinquenal do Governo, PQG 2010–2014)
and its predecessor, as well as Mozambique’s
2006–2009 PRSP (Plano de Acção para Redução
da Pobreza Absoluta, PARPA II).1
However, climate change is still perceived as a
relatively ‘new’ issue, and policy is generally
framed in the context of Disaster Risk Reduction,
in which the country has already developed
significant capacity. This is evident in key
documents, such as the 2007 National Adaptation
Programme of Action (NAPA), the Institute of
Disaster Management (Instituto Nacional de
Gestão das Calamidades, INGC) Master Plan for
2006–2016 and the 2007/08 Government Strategy
for post-flood resettlement. The INGC, the main
government coordination unit for humanitarian
response, is a key implementing agency for
practical mitigation and adaptation interventions
through its operational branch, the National
Centre for Emergency Operations (Centro
Nacional de Operações de Emergência, CENOE).
Despite the broadly favourable policy framework, a
recent bilateral agency review concluded that
climate change ‘is not yet fully integrated in
policies’ (DFID 2009: 2). Mozambique’s climate
change response is hampered by a lack of clarity on
the roles and responsibilities of different
institutions and/or ministries that deal with the
issue, with the Ministry for Planning and
Development (Ministério da Planificação e
Desenvolvimento, MPD) and the Ministry for
Coordination of Environmental Actions (Ministério
para Coordenação de Acção Ambiental, MICOA)
both tasked with a coordination function and key
sector ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture
and powerful agencies such as INGC also expected
to play leading roles. The country’s international
partners also contribute to the lack of clarity, with
different donor cluster groups and multilateral
agencies attempting to play management roles in
the climate policy arena, engaging with different
government partners and encouraging the
formation of multiple ‘coordination centres’ within
the country. Outside government the coordination
problems are even more severe, as networking on
climate change policy issues among civil society
groups is virtually nonexistent.
3 ‘Country ownership’? Political tensions over
the coastal cities component
Mozambique was not on the original list of pilot
countries compiled by the expert group (Seballos
and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin). According to key
informants interviewed during the research, the
country was included in the PPCR after vigorous
lobbying – but this lobbying was carried out by
bilateral aid agencies, not by the Government of
Mozambique itself. Despite the emphasis on
government leadership in the PPCR guidance,
the mission in late 2009 that set in motion the
preparation of Mozambique’s proposal was
planned, designed and led by the MDBs, with
support from the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) and the
United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) (see AfDB et al. 2009). This mission
effectively determined the content of
Mozambique’s Phase 1 proposal, which was
actually drafted by World Bank personnel (see
Government of Mozambique 2010).
The Government of Mozambique made it clear
that it wished its inputs to be coordinated by the
environment ministry (MICOA), but this was
overruled by the international agencies driving
the process (led by the World Bank). The reasons
given were both practical and strategic.
Practically, the World Bank had already
established a management unit in the planning
ministry (MPD) that was capable of fulfilling its
fiduciary requirements and could therefore enable
disbursements to begin more rapidly. Strategically,
placing the project under the MPD would be more
consistent with the overall aims of the PPCR,
which seeks to ‘catalyze a transformational shift’
that can ‘strengthen capacities at the national
levels to integrate climate resilience into
development planning’ (CIF 2009a: 1). Given the
government’s continued insistence that MICOA
should lead, the PPCR Phase 1 proposal described
the option for the MPD as: ‘a transition
arrangement for Phase I only to allow for a rapid
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signature and implementation of the grant’ and
stated that ‘the strategic technical oversight role
would be assumed by an inter-ministerial council
co-chaired by MPD and MICOA’ (Government of
Mozambique 2010: 14). However, the
management plan made no mention of any efforts
to develop an alternative implementation unit
during the course of Phase 1. Thus, while the issue
of which ministry would ultimately lead was left
formally open, it was clearly established that the
PPCR money itself would flow through the MDBs’
preferred channel.
The power of the MDB preferences is evident
from the list of priorities identified in
Mozambique’s PPCR Phase 1 proposal. These
cover investments to support resilience in the face
of drought in the Limpopo valley; flooding in the
Zambezi valley and cyclones in one coastal city, as
well as the ‘climate resilient budget and planning
at central and local level’ that is supposed to be
the programme’s main raison d’être, and work
with the private sector (to be led by the World
Bank’s private sector financing arm, the
International Finance Corporation), described as
‘awareness, access to finance, demonstrational
and pilot solutions, overall enabling environment’
(Government of Mozambique 2010: 11). It rapidly
became clear during the case study research, that
the Limpopo and Zambezi pilots had been chosen
primarily because they were the locations of
ongoing investments by the MDBs.2 This is
entirely consistent with the guidance that ‘PPCR
funded actions should, as an overall practice, not
be free-standing and should be blended with MDB
resources and/or other parallel and co-financing’
(CIF 2009a: 15). However, it is hard to see any
evidence of ‘country ownership’ in this selection.
These existing MDB projects had, of course, been
agreed with the Government of Mozambique –
but not as part of any nationally directed process
designed to strengthen the country’s climate
resilience. The Limpopo region is indeed
vulnerable to drought and the Zambezi to
flooding, but neither was identified in
Mozambique’s NAPA as being the most critical
area for either category of risk (MICOA 2007).
However, while the drought and flood resilience
components of Mozambique’s PPCR Phase 1
proposal seem to reflect MDB priorities rather
than national ones, the case of the coastal cities
component is much less clear-cut. Mozambique’s
NAPA includes protection against coastal erosion
as a priority, but does not mention specific risks
affecting urban areas in the coastal zone.
However, the thorough study of climate-related
disaster risks carried out by the INGC did
include detailed consideration of the potential
impacts on key cities, including Maputo and
Beira (INGC 2009: 11–12).
Rather than an existing programme, the MDB
interest in the case of the coastal cities
component was to use PPCR resources to
support a new one: in this case, a proposed World
Bank urban infrastructure programme, which
would have as its preferred focus the city of
Beira. However, this interest came up against the
reluctance of the Frelimo government to channel
resources to a city that is seen as an opposition
stronghold – however great its economic
significance and however vulnerable it might be
to climate change.
The Aide Memoire which records the conclusions
of the initial PPCR Mission to Mozambique
clearly proposed ‘climate resilient coastal,
transport and urban infrastructure protection at
Beira’ (AfDB et al. 2009: 4). However, by the time
Mozambique came to submit its Phase 1
proposal, the unequivocal option for Beira had
metamorphosed into ‘climate resilient
investments in one coastal city (Beira or other
coastal city)’ (Government of Mozambique 2010:
11). The document’s detailed discussion of the
proposed PPCR coastal cities component
managed to combine redefining the choice of city
as an open multi-option process with signalling a
continued preference for Beira:
The PPCR phase 1 preparation grant would
support development of climate resilience
investment options and an investment plan
for the preferred option, together with longer
term resilience strategies for the city of Beira.
Depending on government priorities other
cities may also be selected.
(Government of Mozambique 2010: 37)
A senior Government of Mozambique
representative interviewed during the fieldwork
confirmed that Beira was the preferred option,
and stated that it would end up receiving the
PPCR investments. When asked why, in that
case, the Phase 1 proposal did not simply make
this clear instead of proposing that an expensive
and time-consuming sequence of consultancies
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and discussions would be undertaken before the
preferred option was officially decided, he simply
replied ‘it is political’ (key informant interview,
Maputo, 15 July 2010). The government’s
position of neither confirming nor denying that
Beira will receive the funds can be interpreted as
a warning to the MDBs that they should not take
its acquiescence for granted when party-political
issues are at stake. It is widely assumed that
Mayor Simango enjoys the support of a
significant proportion of the donor community,
contributing to accusations that his party, the
MDM, has been ‘more inclined to look abroad
[for guidance] than to Mozambique’ (Chichava
2010: 14, our translation).
Significantly, however, the government chose to
focus on the one PPCR component where the
technical case for the identified investment
priorities was strong, given the well-documented
economic importance and climate vulnerability
of Beira. For the drought and flood resilience
components, the government ignored the lack of
fit between the MDBs’ preferred pilot sites and
the priority locations identified in its own
climate analysis, including the NAPA. It seems
that neither the Limpopo nor the Zambezi
regions raises party-political issues in the same
way that Beira under Mayor Simango does, and
therefore that in these cases there was less
incentive for the government to invoke the
principle of ‘country ownership’.
4 ‘Broad participation’? Civil society
engagement in PPCR Phase 1
The PPCR guidance states that Phase 1 should
‘ensure a socially inclusive process during
consultations to provide inputs from a wide range
of actors, such as NGOs and other civil society
groups, specifically vulnerable groups, academe,
and the private sector’ (CIF 2009a: 6). From the
interviews carried out during fieldwork,3 it became
evident that there was no sense among civil society
organisations (CSOs) of having been engaged in
the PPCR Phase 1 process. This was the case even
among those interviewees whose organisations
were listed in the PPCR documentation as having
been consulted, one of whom insisted ‘we now know
about PPCR because you are interviewing us and
not because the government or the MDBs shared
this with CSOs’ (interview, Maputo, 27 July 2010).
The lack of consultation was not regarded as
surprising; interviewees stated that CSOs rarely
have access to processes controlled by the
government and MDBs, and the PPCR process was
seen as just another illustrative example of this
tendency. Where CSOs are invited to engage in
consultative fora linked to such processes, they are
often left feeling that their attendance is merely to
make up the numbers or ‘provide signatures on an
attendance list that legitimates the event’
(interview, Maputo, 13 July 2010). There is also a
sense of participation fatigue, resulting from a
perception that consultations are just a ‘populist’
process of legitimisation of official documents
whereby people arrive to find that everything has
been already decided. Where CSOs insist on going
beyond this legitimation function, they are
perceived by the government as a political
opposition, and accused of seeking to undermine
its plans or block development projects.4
CSO interviewees questioned the lack of public
consultation on the PPCR process, particularly
on the selection criteria for pilot areas as well as
the allocation of funds among these areas.
However, they described their lack of effective
voice in the PPCR Phase 1 process as inevitable,
given the weight of the political or socioeconomic
interests of the agencies leading the process
(specifically for the Government of Mozambique
in Beira, the country’s second most politically
important city, the African Development Bank in
the Limpopo basin and the World Bank in the
Zambezi valley). They asserted that CSOs in
Mozambique needed to learn how to engage with
this reality, by understanding the interests
involved on the side of the government and that
of the MDBs.
Several interviewees raised the issue of the lack
of coordination and clarity on the government
side as an obstacle for effective engagement,
with one stating that:
There is a crisis of leadership in the environment
sector… it suffers from it. There is no clarity in this
agenda; no clear sign of willingness on the part of the
government, if they cannot do it, at least to support
CSOs to address the problem; no government strategy
of communication about the NAPA and other
documents on climate change (interview, Maputo,
27 July 2010).
However, in individual interviews and workshop
discussions in both Maputo and Beira, CSO
representatives acknowledged that fragmentation
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and lack of coordination are problems on the civil
society side as well as that of the government,
and that the difficulties they face in engaging
with climate change policy issues are due to
capacity constraints as well as government
resistance. One outcome of the project workshops
was a commitment from CSO representatives to
try to develop civil society climate change policy
platforms to engage with PPCR both at the
national level and in Sofala Province, where Beira
is located. However, developing effective and
sustainable civil society networks has proved a
challenge in Mozambique, a resource-scarce
context where most incentives are for NGOs to
compete for donor funding rather than
collaborating over strategies for engagement with
the government and other powerful actors.
The PPCR guidance emphasises ‘broad
participation’, but it generally focuses on the role
of such participation in promoting consent and
buy-in to a predefined programme, rather than
on its potential contribution to shaping the
programme itself. However, it does state that
‘specific attention should be given to ensuring
that women, youth, indigenous peoples, local
communities and other vulnerable social groups
are consulted and their views on solutions to
climate risks are considered’ (CIF 2009a: 6–7).
An example of such local ‘views on solutions to
climate risks’ was provided by NGO
representatives and community members
interviewed during our research in Beira, who
emphasised the importance of restoring the
mangrove forests that play a vital role in
stabilising the coastline, as well as in supporting
coastal ecosystems and the livelihoods that
depend on them.5
The PPCR is designed to make use of the
technical studies that are currently under way in
Beira (funded by the EU and the Japanese
government, among others), but these focus
overwhelmingly on the physical infrastructure of
breakwaters and floodgates, which raises the risk
that PPCR will adopt a bias towards heavy
engineering solutions. While physical
infrastructure investment is clearly necessary in
Beira, and has lower transaction costs than
would be the case with a dispersed programme of
community-based restoration of mangroves and
other coastal ecosystems, the former type of
investment has other attractions, both for MDBs
seeking to make fast and large-scale
disbursements and for political elites who wish to
control rent-seeking opportunities.
The Mayor of Beira stressed his awareness of the
need for engineering interventions to be
balanced by mangrove restoration (as well as
tree-planting for dune stabilisation), but he did
not mention any role for civil society in this
process (Daviz Simango interview, Beira, 14 July
2010). Local NGOs and community groups have
been developing innovative strategies to protect
and restore the mangrove forests, but those
interviewed said that the MDB and government
actors driving the PPCR process had made no
effort to draw on their experience, and no Beira-
based CSOs were contacted when the PPCR
mission team visited the city.
Although the PPCR Phase 1 proposal planned
‘a strategic environmental and social impact
assessment (SESIA) of the overall planned
program, including alternatives in the three pilot
poles, with consultations at the local level [that
will] include CSOs and community groups, local
and provincial, public and private stakeholders’
(Government of Mozambique 2010: 13), MDB
representatives interviewed during fieldwork
stated that the SESIA was now to be a desk-based
exercise. This withdrawal of even the limited
consultation opportunities built into the proposal
suggests that the PPCR Phase 1 process is not
likely to provide opportunities for the supposed
local beneficiaries of its investments and other
actors with in-depth local knowledge to
contribute to shaping the programme before the
Phase 2 investment decisions are made. When
this issue was raised at a project workshop, the
World Bank representative leading on the
Mozambique PPCR recognised that civil society
engagement in the process had been very limited
and said he would support efforts by bilateral
donors to strengthen this engagement – but
insisted that limited participation was an
inevitable trade-off for the rapid disbursement on
which many of those same donors had been
insisting (Maputo workshop, 14 October 2010).
5 Conclusions
The experience of Phase 1 of Mozambique’s
PPCR process suggests that the tendency for the
interests of global development actors
(particularly the MDBs) to drive this form of
climate finance is powerful (see Seballos and
Kreft; Tanner and Allouche, both in this IDS
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Bulletin) but by no means uncontested. However,
in Mozambique when contestation did arise it
seemed to derive from a perception that party-
political interests were at stake in the
subnational allocation of PPCR investments, and
not from dissatisfaction at the mismatch between
MDB-identified priorities and those indicated by
the country’s own adaptation planning processes.
While the disagreement over who should lead for
the government on PPCR implementation (which
involved institutional interests) was resolved by
symbolic concessions that left the MDBs firmly in
control of the decision on how and where
resources should flow, the dispute over the
inclusion of Beira (which involved party-political
interests) remained unresolved. Beira’s economic
importance (not least to the members of the
Frelimo elite who own shares in its port and in
the railway that links it with the coalfields)
makes it highly unlikely that it will be excluded
from the PPCR. Nevertheless, by in effect forcing
the MDBs to recognise that it could exercise a
veto over the choice of which coastal city would
receive the investments – even if this flew in the
face of its own climate risk assessments – the
Government of Mozambique was able to assert a
particular kind of country ownership.
On the face of it, the risk that party politics
could trump technical decision-making provides
a good reason for favouring an MDB-dominated
process over country ownership, when the latter
is conflated with (central) government control.
However, the Mozambique case clearly shows
how institutional interests can trump technical
considerations in MDB decision-making – and
that this tendency is reinforced by the PPCR’s
emphasis on rapid disbursements and the
channelling of resources towards existing or
already-planned programmes, whether or not
these are located in the highest-priority areas for
climate resilience investment.
This same emphasis undermines the chances of
an MDB-led process achieving legitimacy, since
it shapes the lack of time and incentives for
actually delivering on the PPCR’s commitment
to ‘broad participation’. Without such
participation, the MDBs will not be able to
support the multi-stakeholder partnerships that
PPCR is supposed to promote. Without opening
the process up to inputs from those who have
local knowledge and are supposed to be the
ultimate beneficiaries of PPCR, the MDBs
cannot sustain a claim to be ‘ensuring that
women, youth, indigenous peoples, local
communities and other vulnerable social groups
are consulted and their views on solutions to
climate risks are considered’ (CIF 2009a: 6–7).
Ultimately, by driving a process that allows
decisions on major climate resilience
investments (including tens of millions of dollars
in loans that the people of Mozambique will be
expected to repay) to be taken without broad
civil society engagement or even public
awareness, the MDBs undermine the PPCR’s
claim that it is ‘designed to catalyze a
transformational shift’ in climate change policy
and adaptation practice, and increase the risk
that it will in fact end up reinforcing rather than
transforming ‘business as usual’ (CIF 2009a: 1).
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Notes
* Research for this article was carried out
through the Political Economy of Low Carbon
Climate Resilient Development project,
coordinated by IDS and funded by the UK
Department for International Development
(DFID). The views expressed here are the views
of the authors and do not represent the views or
policies of IDS, DFID, or the UK government.
1 At the time of writing, the successor to PARPA
II (for the 2011–2014 period) was still being
negotiated by the Government of
Mozambique and international donors.
2 The African Development Bank is supporting
irrigated agriculture around the Massingir
Dam on a tributary of the Limpopo, and the
World Bank is supporting ‘market-oriented
smallholder development’ in the Zambezi
valley.
3 The fieldwork for this case study took place in
Maputo and Beira between July and October
2010.
4 This attitude was evident in the standoff
between MICOA and environmental NGOs
over pollution from the MOZAL aluminium
works that took place during the case study
period.
5 Beira’s critically vulnerable Praia Nova
neighbourhood lost its mangroves during the
civil war, when they were cut down by the
military to prevent guerrillas from sheltering
there, while mangrove forests on the city’s
outskirts are rapidly being depleted by
charcoal-burning.
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